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Emil Brunner's Theory of Social Ethics
Prolegomena: The Quest for a Norm
Paul K. Jewett
The question, What ought I to do?, became the subject of seri
ous philosophic reflection for the first time in ancient Greece, when
the traditional foundations of truth coUapsed before the specula
tions of the cosmologists. From that day to this there have appeared
only two major systems of ethical theory, corresponding to the
Naturalistic-Ideahstic antithesis which has dominated philosophy
through the centuries. The former (Epicurus) begins with Sein; the
latter (Socrates) with Sollen. For the one, ethics is a descriptive
science; for the other, a normative one. At least one thing seems
clear as the student surveys the history of the debate: i.e., one can
never arrive at what ought to be if he begins with what is. Natural
ism turns every virtue to ashes. Duty becomes mere instinct and
conscience simply the collective experience of what is most useful
to the greatest number. The end of the way is the ethic of self-
expression, of power. Might makes right.
By contrast, the ideahstic approach is refreshmg. Kant's cele
brated dictum, "Act only according to that Maxim which at the
same time you can will that it become a universal law," is not
superficial and triflmg, whatever its limitations may be. But this
noble Ideahsm has faded away before the recrudescence of the ethic
of power in the shape of dictatorships, slave camps, brain washings
and bloody purges. Hardly could one have believed its demise
would be so tragicaUy sudden. Physicians are stiU debating the
nature of the disease which brought it about. We are told, for ex
ample, that the modern man, enamored of natural science, is weary
of finely spun systems and refined speculations. For the Christian,
however, the cause is far deeper. Specifically, from the Christian
point of view. Idealism has failed to solve the ethical problem for
two reasons. First of all, it has no place for a genuine doctrine of
revelation. In one way or another, the human and the divine are
merged. The ethical subject is autonomous; that is, able to decide
for himself what he ought to do. Secondly, Ideahsm has no place
for a doctrine of moral incompetence. The last word, even for Kant
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who was not far from the kingdom with his concept of radical evil,
is, I ought, therefore I can.
In Neo-orthodoxy we have, avowedly, an effort to retum to a
truly Christian approach to the ethical question. The norm of right
action is declared to be the wiU of God as he addresses man in his
word; that is to say, the Liberal effort to separate morality from
religion is repudiated in the name of an ethic that is based on the
ology. Furthermore, the Neo-orthodox insist that man is a sinner
and therefore incapable of achieving the ethically good apart from
divine grace.^ Among the followers of Barth, no one has pursued
the implications of this neo-theological approach to ethics with
more thoroughness than Emil Brunner; in fact, in this respect,
Brunner has made more of a contribution than Barth himself, a
contribution which we will now review and evaluate.
In a lecture dehvered to the Kunstgesellschaft in Thun about
ten years ago,^ Bmnner declared that the problem of an autono
mous ethic is the fundamental problem of contemporary human
existence. The attempt to uproot ethics from its religious basis stems
from the spirit of the Enlightenment. Kant was the first who reaUy
set the problem with his severance of the practical reason from the
theoretical reason, and the Positivists proceeded to remove what
vestiges of metaphysical foundation still remained to Kantian ethics,
till morality was reduced to a purely natural factor.^ One could now
love his neighbor as himself without loving God at all. That was
the theory of things until Nietzsche arose to challenge not only the
rehgious basis of the law of love, but the law itself, substituting a
morahty of power,�the survival of the fittest. It is more than a
coincidence that Hitler sent Mussolini the works of Nietzsche as
a personal present. The frightful events precipitated by the practice
of this ethical nihilism should teach us once and for all, according
to Brunner, that such doctrines as the rights of man, the worth of
1 There is not, to be sure, complete unanimity among these thmkers as
to the meaning of such terms as "the word of God," "sin" and "grace." Some
Americans especially, who are classified as Neo-orthodox, give these terms
rather esoteric content.
2 Glaube und Ethik (Thun, Krebser & Co.), 1945.
3 Our generation, says Brunner, is greatly concerned with the gruesome
realities of the total state, but we will not confess that it is not the discovery
of a master criminal, but our own progeny, "the necessary consequence
of our faithless Positivism, which is anti-religious and anti-metaphysical."
Gerechtigkeit (Zurich, 1943), 8.
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personality, the love of neighbor, and all the other values which we
have cherished, are not natural facts, but postulates grounded m a
rehgious conception of reality, without which religious basis theybecome impotent to change men's lives, and float hke beautiful
bubbles m the sun." The fundamental task of the Christian church
is to disabuse the modem mind of the he that man is accountable
to no one, that he is the master of his own fate, the captam of his
own soul. Our only hope of survival is renewal of faith from the
ground up,�reUgious revolution.^ "A disposition to true fellowship
can be awakened only from a reverential love for the Creator. . . .
Therefore, the fundamental question m ethics is none other than
the question of faith."^
The Moral Incompetency of Man
Calvm began the Institutes with the observation that the
knowledge of God is indissolubly united with the knowledge of self.
The validity of this insight, so significant in any discussion of ethics,
is borne out, in a negative way, by what happened in Liberalism
with its substitution of Ideahsm for the message of Scripture. With
the loss of a tmly transcendent view of God, man began to suffer
illusions of grandeur about himseh and his moral possibihties. The
essence of Brunner's reasoning at this point is as follows: In Ideal
ism, because the wiU of autonomous man (rather than the word of
God) is made the final norm of right and wrong; therefore, the per-
verseness of man's wiU is made a bagatelle. If my better self teUs
me I ought to do something, though I may not do it in a given
instance, that is incidental; I can do it. Otherwise the concept
"ought" would not make sense. For Branner, such reasoning is the
curse of legahsm. It suffers from a lack of critical realism. No such
superficial diagnosis of the situation can possibly cope with the
4 Cf. ibid., 7-13. Also his "Christianity and the Cultural Crisis of Our
Days," Current Religious Thought, VII: 22-28, 1947, where he observes that
Buchenwald [with its lampshades of human skin] grimly exhibited the rela
tion between religion and ethics with a poster prominently displayed which
read, "Here there is no God."
5 Cf. his Die reformatorische Botschaft und die Wirtschaftsfrage (Bern
und Leipzig, 1933), 4-7.
6 Das Grundproblem der Ethik (Zurich, 1931), 28-29. For a more tech
nical and exhaustive treatment of this phase of Brunner's ethical thought,
see his major ethical treatise, Das Gebt und die Ordnungen (Tubingen, 1932),
chapters 3 and 28.
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brutal facts of experience. The only adequate answer to the prob
lem of radical evil is "Christian radicalism," in which a man comes
to the place where he recognizes that the accusation of conscience
is the accusation of God and, at the same time, that the God who
accuses is the only one who can remove the accusation. In such an
experience of faith man is restored to a true knowledge of God and
himself. He recognizes God as his sovereign Lord whose every
word he is bound to obey and at the same time discerns his own
impotence to realize this goal. But man cannot of himself play this
role of the prodigal; it is not a matter of New Year's resolutions
and moral rearmament. It is rather a matter of new birth, in which
the entire Existenzrichtung of the individual is reversed.'^ "If any
man be in Christ, he is a new creature; old things are passed
away."^ God is a God who gives the good, apart from the works of
the law, apart from human merit or action, by grace alone. In its
real message, the Bible treats not of a God who demands and a
man who acts, but of a God who acts and a man who receives (dem
beschenkten Mensch).^ As a result of this divine activity there arises
in the heart "a new wiU to do that which the moral law requires."^"
Having sketched the framework within which Brunner ap
proaches the ethical problem, let us now recapitulate and fill in
some of the details. We have seen that he is concerned to give to
ethics a theistic basis. To the moral relativism, the uncertainty
about the question of right and wrong which is the hallmark of our
times, he answers : To be right, something must be right from eter
nity, regardless of what men say or do; but this is true of the will
of God alone. "For the right is nothing else than the wiU of God,
7 Cf. Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 143. "The event of the 'new birth,'
the experience of becoming a new creature, of becoming another person,
occurs only there where the Spirit of God himself touches the human heart,
where the Creator-God creates a turning-about, a "conversion' through his
saving word and his Holy Spirit in the inmost being of man." Gerechtigkeit,
310.
8 Ibid., 43.
8 Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 62-63.
10 Glaube und Ethik, 21. Brunner insists that the Church is culpable
for making faith to consist, not in an experience of renewal, but rather in
the affirmation of the dogmas of the church or the doctrines of the Bible.
Such faith is incapable of developing moral power. "This Catholic misunder
standing of the faith was, indeed, what called forth the reformation protest
and the whole reformation movement" (Ibid., 28).
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and the wrong is nothing else than the opposite of the will of
God."ii But what is the will of God and how do we know it? These
are not easy questions, but obviously they must be answered if one
is to formulate a theological ethic.
There are those among the followers of Barth who have ar
gued on behalf of a Christological basis for ethics, accordmg to
which Jesus himself, as the personal revelation of God in his love,
is the norm from whom all principles of right action are to be de
rived. But Brunner feels this "ethic of the Lamb" is beside the
point, for obviously, society would collapse if the Sermon on the
Mount were made the sole basis of moral obligation. Further
more, there is no real force to the objection that any other approach
to the problem impugns the lordship of Christ over all spheres of
life, for the incarnate Son is the Logos of creation, and he himself
appealed to the order of creation when speaking about such ethical
matters as marriage and divorce.^^ It is proper and necessary, there
fore, that in our efforts to make the will of God the basis of ethical
action, we should begin with the wiU of God as Creator. If one
should object that such a procedure exalts the lex naturae above
Scripture, Brunner would answer that such an objection confuses
the ratio cognoscendi with the ratio essendi. The proposition. Who
so sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed,^* is not,
to be sure, a truth learned by reason or the observation of nature;
it is revelation. But what is revealed is that man's life is sacred
because it is created in the divine image. Murder is wrong because
of what God did in creation.^^
In developing this basal phase of his ethical theory, Brunner
11 Von den Ordnungen Gottes (Bern, 1929), 6-7.
12 This approach is not to be confused with the Liberal "ethics-of-
Jesus" view in which Jesus is simply a concretion of moral ideals, valid in
themselves; exhibit A of what it means to be a Christian. For Brunner's
early repudiation of this position, see his "Zur evangelischen Ethik und
Wertschaftsethik," Kirchenblatt fur die reformierte Schweiz, 85:100, 28
Marz, 1929.
13 For a further discussion, see Brunner's Gerechtigkeit (Zurich, 1943),
321; also "Zwischen Scylla und Charybdis," Kirchenblatt, 100:355 f., 30
Nov., 1944.
14 Genesis 9:6.
15 "Zwischen Scylla und Charybdis," Kirchenblatt, 100:373-4, 30 Nov.,
1944.
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employs freely the formula, creation ordinances (Schopfungsord-
nungen). He prefers such a term to lex naturae or "rights of na
ture." For one thmg, these latter formulations carry with them
certain classical connotations which are incompatible with Christi
anity. In the view of the Stoics and others, the Ratio on which
natural rights were based was divine, the essential element m man,
who, since he needed no revelation, for this reason recognized
none. The Christian, to be sure, acknowledges that it is the reason
which apprehends the divine law, but that does not mean that it is
the reason which gives it.^^ Furthermore, the Roman Catholic theo
logians have identified the lex naturae in an uncritical way with
their dogma of a corpus of universally recognized law. Actually the
facts cannot be squared with such a view of things. The Positivistic
school has eliminated the fiction, ". . . fixed rights of nature." His
tory shows that different peoples in different eras have looked upon
completely different things as good,^^ though it may be that there is
evidence of some very limited material agreement as to the content
of right and wrong action.^� However that may be, the primary
error of the Positivists is the assumption that the difference of ethi
cal practice among the nations means that the idea of right and
wrong is relative. This is a non sequitur. The concept of the right,
in distinction to that which is wrong, what Stammler has called
"the just right," is absolutely indispensable; and while the history
of the race may not testify to any significant material agreement in
the ethical dimension, it emphatically testifies that this distmction
is a matter of universal consciousness.^^ To infer that the idea of
right and wrong, as a critical postulate, is relative because all
i�Cf. his address, "Die Menschenrechte nach Reformierter Lehre,"
Universitdt Zurich Jahresbericht, 1941-42, delivered as rector of the Univer
sity of Ziirich, April 29, 1942.
17 Cf. Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 604-9, 655f.
18 Compare Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 18, with 604-9, 655f. In
Offenbarung und Vernunft (Ziirich, 1941), ten years later, the investigations
of the Roman Catholic, Cathrein, contained in the latter's Die Einheit des
sittlichen Bewusstseins, seem to have induced Brunner to grant a somewhat
larger material unity of moral conviction. He declares (p. 72), "The individ
ual commandments of the Bible are testified to by the religious voices of the
people from all parts of the world, when considered purely according to
their material content." Cf. Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 607.
19 Cf. Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 609; 18.
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people do not have the same ethical views is as absurd as conclud
ing that the axioms of thought are relative because so many contra
dictory claims are made by those who appeal to reason. Interest
ingly enough, the most nihilistic fanatic when it comes to judging
the actions of another or defending his own rights, suddenly evi
dences an astoundingly fine moral sense, in which action he is
recognizing, in praxi if not in thesi, an absolute, eternal idea of the
RIGHT.
Little, then, as the Christian may care for certain connotations
of the term "natural rights," he insists that much of the essential
thought contained therein must be rebuilt into society if our civil
ization is to survive.
Now this idea of an eternal primal ordinance, which is abso
lute and normative for all human law, is what the Christian means
when he speaks of the ordinance (or ordinances) of creation^^ This
creative ordinance is ". . . the celestial model of earthly ordi-
nances."22 Only on such a basis can we formulate an ethic that has
relevance for aU men, which, of course, we must do if we are to
discharge our Christian responsibility, especially m the sphere of
social ethics.23 Though it is true that the Bibhcal view of reaUty
postulates the entrance of sm mto the world, and that in the radical
sense of the term, yet this does not mean that the ontology of crea
tion has been destroyed, nor does it mean that the epistemological
situation of the natural man has become hopeless. To be sure, the
Christian point of view involves and rests upon assumptions of a
rehgious character which are not recognized by all men because of
their sin, but since the Christian doctrme of creation is true, all
men are bound more or less to acquiesce m its practical implica-
20 "If there is no sacrosanct, eternal, divme, absolute justice, then there
is no possibility of calling anything, be it a law, a civU system, or
action of
the state, unjust; if the Positivistic theory of justice is correct, then there
is
no possibility of fighting against the total state as a monster of wickedness.
Then one cannot say: it is unjust; but only: it does not please me; I do not
like such things." Gerechtigkeit, cir. 8.
21 Whether the singular or plural number is used is immaterial. Con
sider the interchange of decree and decrees in theological discussions.
22 "Zwischen Scylla und Charybdis," Kirchenblatt, 100:374, 30 Nov.,
1944.
23 "The final ground of social ethics is always: the creation ordinance
of God." Ibid., 356.
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tions.24 God works as Creator and Preserver, even there, where
men do not know anything about Him. Therefore, His creative
ordmances can be effective, even where man does not recognize
Him as Creator.''^^ As a matter of fact, the laws of nature with
which all scientists reckon and apart from which, science (and life)
would be impossible, are simply creation ordinances, which, rightly
understood, provoke a spirit of reverence in the mind of the mvesti-
gator for the great Creator and Sustamer of cosmic lawfuhiess.2�
These laws of nature govern man msofar as he is a physico-
biological object of the world. But man differs from the lihes of the
field and the birds of the heavens. God feeds and clothes both, but
not in the same way, for man, fashioned after the divine image, is
free, though responsible to his Maker for the use of his freedom.
And the Creator has so constituted man that to use his freedom
responsibly means to use it in fellowship�fellowship, that is, with
God and all men. "For our neighbor meets us not only as an indi
vidual, but as a bearer and member of definite ordinances of fellow
ship, which we will call in the narrower sense of the term, creation
ordinances. We understand by this term such items of human com
munal life as are related to all historical life as unalterable pre
suppositions; therefore, in their form, historically variable; how
ever, in their basic structure, unalterable; and such as at the same
time in certam definite ways point men to one another and join
them together."^'^
What are some of these ordinances of fellowship? The most
basic and primary one, Brunner feels, is the family; the most aU-
embracive one is the State. Besides these, he speaks of friendship
(the fellowship of eros), economics (the fellowship of work), and
the church (the fellowship of faith).
We cannot, however, follow Brunner as he works out the im-
24 Ibid., 374. For a cursory review of the controversy between Barth
and Brunner on Natural Theology, see my Emil Brunner's Concept of Reve
lation, 17. Significantly, Barth has never been very interested in social ethics,
though he finally got around to shaking off the dust of Hitler's German
Reich from his Swiss feet.
23 Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 204.
26 We see a confused but significant expression of such reverence,
Brunner feels, in the Greek's idea of a cosmos, by which they meant a super
human, divine order (Sinnganzes), an idea awakened in them by the regu
larity of nature. Cf. Gerechtigkeit, 56.
27 Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 194.
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plications of this Christian ontology, without bearing in mind that
he looks upon human life not only as created by God but fallen
from God. Since man is created as a person, he is so created
". . . that he must determine himself to that to which he is deter-
mined."28 This dignity, however, is his danger, for, by the exercise
of his freedom, man has determined himseU to the opposite of his
proper end. Whereas he was created to enjoy the fellowship of God,
he has become the enemy of God. He has retained his formal free
dom, but has lost his material freedom. He has become, as Brunner
puts it, the slave of his own emancipation.^^ Hence, the natural man
in the actual working out of the imphcations of the creation ordi
nances for his life, has garbled and marred the original, like an
incompetent builder who will not follow the architect's plans. This
does not mean, as we have already observed, that the non-Christian
has nothing to contribute to our theory and practice in the varied
relationships of life. Though sin has darkened human understand
ing, these matters are not so wholly inaccessible to reason but that
the natural man may have real, though madequate insights. But
it does mean that we cannot undialectically identify the will of God
with what is. ". . . We recognize the creation of God always as
broken by sin and therefore, the will of God confronts us only in
directly, never directly. There is nothing real m this world, which
God does not will, but there is also nothing m this world which
God also does not wUl."^^
The Christian, then, is basically conservative, i.e., he has rev
erence for natural, historical reality.32 ^^d yet a rigid conservativ-
ism on the order of ancient Chinese ethics would be as brutal as the
real world is.^^
28 Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 153.
29 Ibid., 153. For a fuller discussion of Brunner's concept of personal
ity with a critique see my article, "Ebnerian Personalism and Its Influence
upon Brunner's Theology," The Westminster Theological Journal, 16:113-
47, May, 1952.
30 Brunner feels, for example, that Aristotle laid the foundations of
the doctrine of justice for all time. Gerechtigkeit, 108.
31 Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, 110.
32 Cf. "Die ethische Bedentung des Christlichen Dogmas," Der Grund-
riss, 1: esp. 379 (Dec. 1939) where he affirms that the spirit of irreverence is
the kernel of Bolshevism.
33 An example of the latter in Christian circles would be inflexible
views on divorce which turn the married state under certain circumstances
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Turning then to Brunner's treatment of the divine ordinances
of creation as they have come to more or less adequate expression
in the actual institutions of history, we find that his analysis turns
about two fundamental aspects of man's bemg as constituted by the
Creator. AU the ordinances of human life, in the narrower sense of
the term, are for the purpose of preserving and fostering these two
primary human values, i.e., freedom and fellowship. Man is created
for freedom in fellowship and fellowship in freedom.^^ Each con
cretion of the creation ordinances in history is more or less just,
more or less approximating the ideal, in proportion as it promotes
". . . a feUowship grounded in mutual dependence, which at the
same time does not invalidate original freedom and equality."^^
Because of man's sinfulness this two-fold ideal of freedom and
feUowship is constantly degenerating into the extremes of Individ
ualism on the one hand and Collectivism on the other. In order to
appreciate how this is so, we must understand what Brunner means
by such terms as Individualism and Collectivism.
As for Individualism, it is the lesser of the two evils, inasmuch
as Collectivism, by the destruction of individual freedom, destroys
the possibUity of criticism and therefore, of correction.^^ In fact, if
one means by Individualism, the preservation of the individual
from absorption into the collective unit, then the Christian faith is
individualistic; for man is made for the ordinances, not the ordi
nances for man.^^ But generally, Brunner means by Individualism
the view that every man is sufficient unto himself, and responsible
only to himself for how he lives and enjoys his freedom.^^ Philo-
into a curse; or an appeal to the ordinance of the family to prove the
woman's place is in the home with no consideration of the fact that there are
in certain societies several more million marriageable women than men. Such
a position stems from a failure to remember that ". . . the creation ordi
nances of God are not to be identified with given realities." "Zur Sozial-
ethik," Kirchenblatt, 85:326f., 10 Oct., 1929. We shall say more of these
things later, but cf. also "Zur Evangelischen Ethik, etc.," 99-100.
34 Cf. "Die politische Verantwortung des Christen," Der Grundriss,
6:89, Marz/April, 1944.
35 "Das Kapitalismus als Problem der Kirche," 6:327, Nov./Dec,
1944.
36 Cf. Kommunismus, Kapitalismus und Christentum (Ziirich, 1948), 8.
37 Gerechtigkeit, 160.
38 Cf. "Die gottliche Schopfung der Familienordnung und ihre Zers-
torung," Grundriss, 3:34, Feb., 1941.
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sophically, this popular approach to hfe has its roots in the Greek
idea that the Ratio is the essence of humanity. Accordingly, every
man has that which is essential in himself, and does not need his
neighbor. In fact, this emancipation of the individual from his
neighbor is but the ethical expression of his emancipation from
God, in which emancipation, reason views itself as . . the final
court of appeal in matters of truth and the moulding of hfe."^^
Brunner calls it, ". . . getting rid of God by the use of reason.''^"
But we should not assume, as some economic theorists have
dreamed, that the answer to Individuahsm is Collectivism. That
would be to cast out the Devil by Beelzebub. In the last analysis
CoUectivism is Individualism's twin brother since it is bom, "... of
the abstract rational concept of equahty.""^ Autonomous reason
again is the final court of appeal. The whole, which is thus achieved,
is simply an atomistic conglomerate in which the individual is lost,
and this is tme not only when one seeks the goal by violence as in
Russian Communism, but also when one seeks it by legislation as
in English Socialism. In fact, if a Christian had to choose, he would
choose Individualism over Collectivism, for though the former is a
distorted half-truth, it is the larger half of the truth. The curse of
Collectivism is that it destroys the individual, but God has created
us as individuals; therefore, the individual can never be regarded
as a nothing, to be sacrificed to the whole which is everythmg. God
loves not humanity in general, but the individual in particular, in
the pecuharity of his created being. "God creates no schemes, but
individuals. He whom he addresses as 'thou,' he thereby gives his
unchangeable face, his individuahty.""^
Against these twin evUs, Brunner pits the Christian concept of
individual freedom expressed and realized in fellowship. To under
stand these latter terms in the light of what we have said above, is
to understand everything he has to say of an essential sort, in the
broad sphere of social ethics.
39 Das Grundproblem der Ethik, 10.
40 Ibid., 10.
41 Das Gebt und die Ordnungen, All.
42 Cf. Gerechtigkeit, 99.
43 Ibid., 47. For a powerful indictment of Communism and rebuttal of
any neutral position respecting it on the part of the church, see his Kom
munismus, Kapitalismus und Christentum (Ziirich, 1948), the section en
titled, "Das Nein dir Kirche zum Kommunismus," 15-26.
